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1. Theoretical Part  
 
1.1 Introduction 
The word “feedback” is a term that has its origin in systems theory and 
cybernetics, where it is widely used to describe a signal that feeds back the 
information about the current state of a system, after that system has changed its 
initial state (Häcker & Stapf, 2004). Thus, feedback conveys information about the 
change in system properties that help to regulate and to monitor system 
operations. In this sense feedbacks are crucial for the functioning of automated 
machines as well as for biological systems (for example, consider feedback-loops 
in the hippocampus that are required for learning mechanisms; cf. Wehner & 
Gehring, 2007). In a similar way, feedbacks also serve their function in social 
communication situations, with the difference that a given feedback is transferred 
from one system to another (from person to person), instead of being signaled 
between the subunits within one system alone. An information exchange in form of 
a feedback during interpersonal communication does not necessarily require the 
recipient to change his or her behavior or attitude according to the information, as 
opposed to technical or biological systems. Still, feedbacks are very important for 
social interactions and even social survival in a world where human beings have to 
collaborate with each other on a daily basis. The interpersonal feedback has been 
investigated thoroughly in the field of social psychology. Recently, feedback 
processing became also a topic of neuroscientific research, after social issues 
have emerged there in the early 90’s of the 20th century, which led to the 









1.2 The feedback- and error-related negativity and their 
common origin in the anterior cingulate cortex.  
In neuroscience, feedback processing has been mainly examined using EEG and 
fMRI techniques. An event-related potential (ERP), measured with EEG, that 
showed a negative deflection in the ongoing wave after subjects received a 
negative feedback, was termed “feedback-related negativity” (FRN). The FRN was 
found in many studies and is, at the moment, besides the ERN, the most 
prominent ERP in the research of feedback processing. The FRN has first been 
discovered and described in detail by Miltner, Braun and Coles (1997) who carried 
out an EEG experiment using a time-estimation task. In their design, subjects were 
required to estimate the duration of one second after presentation of a cue by 
pressing a button. They received a performance feedback 600 ms after the button 
press, indicating whether the estimation had been accurate or not. In trials with a 
negative feedback (inaccurate estimation) the ERP-wave became more negative 
(in comparison to the trials with a positive feedback) and peaked 200 – 300 ms 
after feedback onset. Miltner and his colleagues proposed that there is a 
relationship between the FRN and the error-related negativity (ERN). The ERN 
occurs earlier (with a peak approximately 80 – 120 ms after stimulus onset) and is 
elicited by an error that is self-evident for the subject performing the task, whereas 
the FRN only occurs when the outcome of an event has to be mentioned explicitly 
in form of a feedback (Heldmann, Rüsseler & Münte, 2008). In other words: a 
feedback after a self-evident error would be redundant and therefore not 
necessary for an ERN, but essential for the FRN to occur, because without it, 
there would be no information about the outcome of an event. Miltner et al. (1997) 
regarded both ERPs as parts of a generic error-detection system, because they 
both respond to negative outcomes, only differing in the way that error information 





Figure 1: An example showing that ERN and FRN have different latencies and are evoked by 
different sources of information (error = internal; malfunction-feedback = external). Adapted from 
Gentsch, Ullsperger and Ullsperger (2009). 
 
The terminology of ERPs that are concerned with error and feedback processing 
can be confusing, because different terms and abbreviations are used in the 
literature to describe the same brain potentials. “Ne”, for example, is sometimes 
used as an abbreviation for the error-related negativity. Another example comes 
from a study from Gehring and Willoughby (2002) in which they postulated a new 
event-related potential that occurs when subjects experience a loss in a gambling 
task. They called it “medial-frontal negativity” (MFN), assuming that this ERP has 
its source in the medial-frontal area of the brain. The study design included a 
gambling task with two choices that could either reveal a win or a loss in each 
separate trial. It has been shown, that the MFN was sensitive to monetary losses, 
disregarding the relative amount of the monetary outcome. Losing 5 cents in a 
single trial, even though the other choice would have been a loss of 25 cents, 
created the same negative deflection in the EEG waveform that occurred when the 
other choice would have been a monetary gain and vice versa. In the first example 
the MFN was elicited despite the fact that a loss of 5 cents was clearly the better 
choice, compared to a loss of 25 cents. Therefore the authors suggested that this 
brain potential is not responsible for error detection but rather for the registration if 
an outcome can be regarded as negative or positive in general. Since the MFN 
and FRN have the exact same shape and latency with both of them being 
recorded from frontal electrode sites, both ERP terms can be regarded as 
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interchangeable. Some researchers used the term MFN when they investigated 
outcome evaluation in monetary gambling tasks (e.g. Fukushima & Hiraki, 2006; 
2009), whereas others used the term FRN for these experiments (e.g. Yu & Zhou, 
2006; Itagaki & Katayama, 2008). Overall, the notion that the FRN and the MFN 
are basically the same is fairly widespread within the scientific community. 
 
One theoretical explanation for the ERN/FRN, which has received much credit 
within the scientific community, is the reinforcement learning theory of the ERN, 
first introduced by Holroyd and Coles in 2002. They suggested that the ERN 
marks a reward prediction error that occurs when ongoing events are worse than 
expected. The detection of an error entails a signal that is mediated by the 
mesencephalic dopamine system and conveyed to the anterior cingulated cortex 
(ACC), which in turn generates an error signal. According to the theory, this error 
signal is used to induce a reinforcement learning process that guides action 
selection based on the experiences of earlier events. Further explanation how the 
ERN/FRN and the ACC are related will be given later.  
 
That the ERN and the FRN denote a reward prediction error (Holroyd and Coles, 
2002), rather than a mere evaluation of good and bad outcomes, has gained 
support from several studies. Holroyd, Niewenhuis, Yeung and Cohen (2003) 
found that the FRN was larger for losses in trials where wins were more likely (win-
probability: 75 %; loss-probability: 25 %). Consequently, losses in the condition 
where they occurred more frequently (win-probability: 25 %; loss-probability: 75 %) 
led to a smaller FRN. According to Holroyd et al. (2003) the brain makes 
predictions about future outcomes and because it learned in the latter condition 
that losses where more likely to occur, a perceived loss was consistent with the 
brains expectations which led to a smaller FRN. A similar study from Holroyd, 
Larsen and Cohen (2004a) replicated the findings from Holroyd et al. (2003). 
Holroyd et al. (2004a) came to the conclusion: “An outcome is judged to be good 
or bad relative to the expectation, rather than in terms of its objective value” 
(p.250). Nevertheless, the findings have been mixed, with a later study concluding 
in favor of the hypothesis that the FRN only reflects the evaluation of good vs. bad 
outcomes (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd & Simons, 2006). To circumvent problems with 
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the measurement of the FRN in different conditions Holroyd and Krigolson (2007) 
calculated difference-waves with the FRN amplitudes from a time-estimation task 
(with the design from Miltner et al., 1997). There was a hard condition (small time 
window for correct answers) and an easy condition (wider time window for correct 
answers). The authors compared unexpected outcomes (errors in easy trials and 
correct responses in hard trials) with expected outcomes (errors in hard trials and 
correct responses in easy trials) and found that the FRN again was larger for 
unexpected outcomes.  
 
Gehring and Willoughby (2002) proposed that the MFN/FRN does not respond to 
error-feedback information but rather reflects the motivational impact of an 
outcome event. They based this assumption on the finding that the riskier a choice 
was, the larger the MFN became after a loss trial. In line with this assumption, 
Yeung, Holroyd and Cohen (2005) found that the FRN was smaller in a monetary 
gambling task when subjects made no active choices or carried out no overt 
actions, compared to a task where the outcomes were contingent upon the 
subjects’ response choices. In addition there was also a correlation between the 
FRN amplitudes and subjects’ ratings on how much they felt to be involved in the 
task (with larger FRN amplitudes corresponding to higher involvement-ratings). 
Like in the study of Gehring and Willoughby, other studies also support the notion 
that valence and magnitude of preceding outcomes influence the FRN in 
subsequent trials, indicating that motivational factors also modulate this brain 
potential (Masaki, Takeuchi, Gehring, Takasawa & Yamasaki, 2006; Goyer, 
Woldorff & Huettel, 2008). 
 
The assumption by Miltner et al. (1997) that the FRN and ERN are phenomena of 
the same neural processes, as well as the notion that both ERPs share the same 
neural source, is backed-up by several studies. Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, 
Nystrom, Mars, Coles et al., (2004b) conducted a fMRI study were subjects had to 
perform a probabilistic learning task. They received a financial reward for pressing 
the right button after stimulus presentation and a financial punishment for pressing 
the wrong button. The study design included trials where subjects realized 
themselves, if they made a wrong response (internal information) and trials where 
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subjects had to get a feedback for outcome evaluation (external information). 
Holroyd et al. (2004b) found that the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) was 
more activated in trials with errors signaled from both information sources.  
Another study that provides evidence that FRN and ERN share a common source 
comes from Gentsch, P. Ullsperger and M. Ullsperger (2009). They used a flanker 
task to trigger an ERN when an error occurred by the subject, or a FRN when a 
malfunction signal indicated that an error occurred that was caused by the 
computer. The malfunctions signals presented a form of unpredictable external 
interference with goal achievement. Via independent component analysis (ICA) 
Gentsch et al. revealed that externally generated failures are processed by a 
neural network that is, in large part, also responsible for the processing of self 
induced errors. The finding suggests that both ERPs share a common neural 
source and represent a complementary monitoring mechanism for internal and 
external generated error signals.  
 
Besides fMRI studies, there exists at least one positron emission tomography 
(PET) study where the emergence of the FRN could be traced back to activity in 
the ACC. During a stochastic decision-making task simultaneous recordings of 
EEG-ERPs and PET were carried out on subjects. An activation of the ACC was 
found in both, the contingent reward and the random reward condition. The 
investigators also found a correlation between the activation of the ACC and the 
amplitudes of the ERP components FRN and FRP (which, due to its height and 
latency, looks actually like a P3) (Hideki et al., 2010). Considering the possibility 
that both FRN and ERN are responsible for similar outcome evaluation processes 
and taking into account that several studies found an association of the FRN with 
the ACC, it is likely that error-related brain activity will also be located in the ACC. 
This was shown in studies using dipole analysis for source localization (Ruchsow 
et al., 2002) and in fMRI studies (e.g. Carter, Braver, Barch, Botvinick, Noll & 
Cohen, 1998; Kiehl, Liddle & Hopfinger, 2000; Menon, Adleman, White, Glover & 
Reiss, 2001). Additionally, recordings of intracranial, local field potentials from 
non-human primates also revealed activation of the ACC after an error was 
committed, in studies using Macaques (Gemba, Sasaki & Brooks, 1986; Emeric, 
Brown, Stuphorn, Leslie, Pouget & Schall., 2008).  
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However, it should be noted, that not all research findings are consistent. Some 
scientists cast doubt upon the notion that the ACC is involved in error processing 
and therefore gives rise to the ERN and FRN. Gehring and Willoughby (2004) 
argued that the different scalp distributions of the ERN and FRN respectively do 
not confirm the widespread idea that both ERPs reflect the same underlying neural 
generator. Van Veen, Holroyd, Cohen, Sterngerd & Cartere (2004) as well as 
Nieuwenhuis, Slagter, Alting von Geusau, Helsenfeld & Holroyd (2005b) were both 
unable to find an error-feedback-related activation in the ACC. It is interesting to 
mention that the main author of the first study - van Veen - reported two years 
beforehand that he and his colleague have found that the ACC was responsible for 
eliciting the ERN (van Veen & Cameron, 2002). The same accounts for two 
authors from the second study – Nieuwenhuis and Holroyd – who also reported 
one year before that internal and external error signals activated the dACC 
(Holroyd et al., 2004). Thus, even the results from the same researchers regarding 
a specific question, can sometimes vary between different studies. 
 
1.3 Feedback- and error-processing in self-induced and 
observed errors 
Thinking about a neural signal that reflects the processing of an error or a negative 
feedback one question immediately arises: would this signal also be sensitive to 
observed errors and observed negative feedbacks, or would it be restricted to 
negative outcomes that only concerned the observer himself? The information, 
acquired by observation, that the behavior of others leads, for example, to an error 
can be important to oneself, if one wants to avoid committing errors in similar 
situations. Furthermore, the observation of negative outcomes obtained by others 
could elicit an emotional response, especially when the observed person is a close 
friend or relative.  
 
With respect to the FRN, the following studies seem to confirm these thoughts. 
That an ERN was elicited when subjects failed to execute a task, and an FRN 
when errors induced by others were observed, was interpreted as an important 
mechanism for observation-learning (van Schie, Mars, Coles & Bekkering, 2004) 
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and as a mirror-system of error-monitoring that helps to empathize with the 
misfortune of others (Miltner, Brauer, Hecht, Trippe & Coles, 2003). Van Shie et al. 
and Miltner et al. both used a flanker task with a self-execution and an 
observation-condition. While subjects in the experiment from van Schie et al. 
directly observed the task performance of another player who sat in front of them, 
subjects in the design form Miltner et al. observed the performance of a simulated 
player on their computer screen (but they thought they would actually observe the 
performance of another person in another room). The FRN in the observation 
condition of both studies was smaller than the ERN in the self-execution condition, 
but the FRN was larger when observing incorrect performances, compared to 
correct ones.  
 
One way of exploring whether the observation of an unfavorable feedback that is 
being received by others leads to a FRN in the observer, is to use gambling tasks 
in an experimental design. In EEG experiments this approach has been applied 
very frequently. The emergence of an ERP that was described as “FRN-like” was 
observed when subjects monitored others experiencing a monetary loss (Yu & 
Zhou, 2006). In the design, adopted by Gehring and Willoughby (2002), subjects 
consecutively either performed the task, or observed the performance of another 
person on their computer screen. The amplitude of the FRN was largest in the 
condition where the subjects experienced their own losses and significantly 
smaller for the observed losses. This indicates that negative outcomes of others 
are somehow relevant for us, but not as much as our own losses.  
In the study of Yu and Zhou’s (2006) the subjects presumably regarded the 
observed losses as similarly negative as their own. But the way in which the 
outcomes of others are evaluated clearly depends on the relevance that these 
outcomes have for the respective observer. The misfortune of one person could 
mean an advantage for another if they were in a competitive situation. This finding 
was obtained by Itagaki2008). In a gambling situation subjects had either to 
cooperate with one another (cooperative condition) or play against each other 
(antagonistic condition). If one player lost in the cooperative condition it was a loss 
for both players. Consequently, the observation of the partner’s loss elicited an 
FRN in the other player. On the other hand, in the antagonistic condition, the gain 
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of player A meant a loss for player B, and vice versa. In this situation the 
observation of the gain of player A also elicited an FRN in player B. In conclusion, 
the evaluation of an observed outcome determines if it is perceived as positive or 
negative for oneself and therefore if a FRN is elicited or not.  
 
Considering the many studies which found evidence that the ERN and FRN are 
generated in the ACC, it can most probably be concluded that if those signals are 
present in the observation of errors of negative outcomes from others, they would 
also be located in the ACC. At least one study exists, which shows that perceived 
errors committed by others are also accompanied by activation in the dACC 
(Shane, Stevens, Harenski & Kiehl, 2008). While subjects where lying in a fMRI-
scanner, they performed a go/no-go task themselves and also watched a video of 
another person performing on the same task. An error that would evoke an ERN if 
the same task had been used in an EEG-study activated the dACC in both the 
self-performance and observing condition. This result again strengthens the 
hypothesis that this brain region is involved in error processing.  
 
Recently, in order to explain why ERPs that process unfavorable outcomes are 
also found when observing others, some scientists have related this phenomenon 
to empathy. Beside the hypothesis that the observational-ERN and FRN reflect a 
mechanism of observational learning (e.g. van Schie et. al., 2004), empathetic 
concern for the mishap of others is the most frequently used explanation within the 
scientific community (e.g. Miltner et al., 2003; Larson, Fair, Good & Baldwin, 
2010). 
 
If one is trying to define empathy, the problem arises that there are almost as 
many definitions for empathy as there are researchers who investigate this 
psychological construct (Singer & Lamm, 2009). Although this accounts for the 
variability in the description of the term, there seem to be three core components 
of the construct that most scientists agree on: 1. an affective response towards 
another person; 2. a process of perspective-taking; and 3. a monitoring 
mechanisms that enables us to differentiate between feelings that originated in 
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ourselves and feelings that were induced by the observation of others (Lamm, 
Batson & Decety, 2007). It has also been argued that two mechanisms constitute 
empathy: a bottom up process that is the automatic emotional response towards 
another person and a top down process which involves cognitive appraisal of a 
specific situation to modulate an emotional experience (Decety & Lamm, 2006). 
Human empathy is a rather complex and multidimensional phenomenon that urges 
deeper exploration, but is, due to its versatile nature, difficult to approach with well-
controlled experimental designs (Singer & Lamm, 2009). Nevertheless, acquiring 
at least some knowledge about the neural correlates of empathy would provide an 
“objective” approach to a psychological construct that has been studied, up to 
recently, merely phenomenologically.  
 
In two studies, Fukushima and Hiraki (Fukushima & Hiraki, 2006; 2009) linked the 
MFN to empathy. The design of Gehring and Willoughby (2002) was again used to 
show that this feedback-related ERP was equally evoked in self-experienced and 
observed monetary losses. In their earlier study the authors investigated the 
question whether female and male subjects differed in their affective and 
electrophysiological response to monetary losses in an antagonistic gaming 
situation, where the gain of one player resulted in the loss of the other and vice 
versa (like in the design of Itagaki & Katayama, 2008). Additionally to the EEG 
recordings, subjects also had to fill out questionnaires about, amongst others, their 
affective states towards their own and the other player’s outcomes. While males 
showed a MFN when they lost money, as well as when they noticed that the other 
player won money, females didn’t show the same effect. Within the female group 
the gain of the other player did not elicit a MFN, even though they were well aware 
that this meant a loss for them. Correspondingly, the females also showed a more 
positive affect for the outcome of the opponent compared to the males (meaning 
that females rated the gain of the opponent as less negative compared to males). 
This gender effect was explained by the authors with the reference to the higher 
level of empathy within women. The study of Fukushima and Hiraki (2009) 
incorporated three conditions in their gambling-task design: one’s own wins and 
losses; the wins and losses of a befriended player; and the wins and losses of a 
PC program. In contrast to their study from 2006 each subject played 
independently. As expected, the losses in the first and second condition elicited a 
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MFN in the subjects. Interestingly, when monetary losses by the PC player in the 
third condition were observed, the MFN was absent. This signifies that subjects 
experienced an emotional reaction when recognizing that their friend was losing 
money, whereas the loss of the PC player was not a matter of emotional concern. 
This conclusion is also supported by the positive correlations between the 
amplitude of the other-MFN and the self-ratings in empathy questionnaires.  
 
A correlation between the ERN and the ratings in an empathy questionnaire, 
similar to the one shown before, has also been reported in an article from 
Santesso and Segalowitz (2009).  
 
Figure 2: The ACC on the medial surface of the right hemisphere. Marked in blue is the rostral part 
of the ACC and in red the dorsal part, with the numbers displaying the respective Brodmann areas 
(adapted from: Bush, Luu & Posner, 2000) 
 
Moreover, the link between error- and feedback-processing and empathy has also 
been invigorated by studies that suggested that the activation of the ACC (which is 
proposed to be the generator of the ERN and FRN) gives rise to feelings of 
empathy (Newman-Norlund, Ganesh, van Schie, Bruijin & Bekkering, 2008), 
especially considering empathy for pain and stress observed in others (Morrison, 
Lloyd, di Pellegrino & Roberts , 2004; Singer, O’Doherty, Kaube, Dolan & Frith, 
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2004; Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff & Decety, 2006; Lamm et al., 2007). Interestingly 
Singer et al. found that the activation of the rostral ACC (rACC) showed a 
significant positive covariation with subject’s results in two empathy 
questionnaires, indicating that high-empathetic people had a higher activation of 
the rACC during observation of pain in others. On the other hand Newman-
Norlund et al. came to opposite results: activation of the ventral ACC (vACC) while 
observing errors induced by others covaried negatively with the results of an 
empathy questionnaire. They explained this discrepancy with the hypothesis that 
high empathetic subjects are better in down-regulating negative affect and that 
conditions which allow to select a regulatory strategy (like in their study), would 
lead to less ACC-activation in empathetic subjects, whereas a lack of control of 
emotional regulation (like in the study of Singer et al, 2004) would induce a 
stronger activation of the ACC in empathetic subjects. Figure 2 depicts the rostral 
and dorsal parts of the ACC. 
 
1.4 The P300  
The P300, also referred to as P3, is an endogenous event-related potential that 
peaks around 250 – 500 ms (it owes its large range to the fact that its latency 
varies significantly across different stimulus conditions) and can be subdivided into 
two parts: the P3a and the P3b. Whereas the P3a is recorded from more frontal 
electrode sites and reflects stimulus-driven attentional mechanisms, the P3b 
originates from parietal activity and is associated with attention to task relevant 
stimuli (Polich, 2007). As an endogenous ERP it depends much on the processing 
of stimulus context and the levels of attention and arousal and increases with 
lower probability and higher discriminability of targets (Linden, 2005). Figure 3 
shows a typical P300 wave that is sensitive to infrequent stimuli. A widely 
accepted explanation for the P300 is provided by the context updating theory. 
According to the theory, the mental model of the context of a stimulus is 
maintained if no change in stimulus attribute is detected. But if a new stimulus 
emerges, attentional processes govern an “update” of stimulus representation 
which is accompanied by a P300 peak (Donchin & Coles, 1988).  
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When researchers write about the P300, in the abundance of cases, they are 
referring to the P3b (Luck, 2005). Although the P300 was discovered more than 40 
years ago (Polich, 2007) and there exists a multitude of studies about that ERP, it 
is still a matter of debate what precise cognitive processes the wave may reflect 
(Luck, 2005).  
 
Figure 3: A typical P300 wave responding to infrequent stimuli, whereas the line in light-gray 
(frequent stimulus) shows no apparent positive deflection (adapted from Linden, 2005). 
 
1.4.1 The modulation of the P300 in gambling tasks: reward magnitude and 
reward valence 
In a similar way as the FRN has been elicited via gambling tasks, the P300 was 
also investigated using these tasks to elucidate which effects different outcomes 
have on the P300. With a simple gambling task, Yeung and Sanfey (2004) found 
out that there is a double dissociation between the FRN and the P300. The task 
required to choose one of two cards, presented with different colors. First the 
valence and magnitude of the chosen option (e.g. +7) was shown, then, after the 
number vanished, the valence and magnitude of the alternative option (e.g. -36) 
was presented. The results revealed that the P300 was sensitive to reward 
magnitude but not to reward valence, while the FRN was sensitive to reward 
valence but not to reward magnitude. The authors found another dissociative 
pattern regarding the electrophysiological response to the unchosen, alternative 
option. Here the P300 was sensitive to the magnitude of the alternative option (a 
larger magnitude evoked a larger P300) whereas the FRN was unaffected by the 
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valence of the alternative outcome. These findings provide evidence that reward 
magnitude and reward valence are separately processed in the brain.  
Shortly thereafter in a study that was mainly concerned with the question if the 
FRN reflects mere outcome evaluation or an action-learning process that helps to 
attain desired outcomes, Yeung et al. (2005) also found that the P300 was 
modulated in two experimental monetary gambling tasks. In both experiments, 
subjects had either to do a choice task (selecting a button to win money) or a no-
choice task (pressing a button that started a roulette-like game). The second 
experiment additionally provided a no-response task (similar to the no-choice task 
with the difference that the roulette began spinning without pressing a button). The 
P300 amplitude was significantly larger in the choice task of both experiments 
alike, suggesting that this ERP is sensitive to the level of involvement in the task. 
Again, the valence of the feedback stimulus (wins or losses) did not significantly 
influence the amplitude of the P300.  
 
Seemingly the P300 is not (significantly) affected by the valence of rewards 
according to those two last cited studies. Other investigators, however, couldn’t 
replicate these findings. In two experiments from Hajcak, Holroyd, Moser and 
Simons (2005) where people had to perform on a guessing task, the P300 was 
sensitive to feedback valence being larger for positive feedback than for negative 
feedback. A study with children (average age: 8 years) who played a game where 
they could win or lose apples to feed a hungry donkey, also revealed a significant 
effect for outcome valence, but in an opposite direction (Carlson, Zayas & 
Guthormsen, 2009). Here punishments (losses) elicited a larger P300 compared to 
rewards (wins). Another study examined, amongst others, the modulation of the 
P300 to false and veridical feedbacks, while subjects carried out correct actions in 
both conditions (Balconi & Crivelli, 2010). The results showed that false feedback 
led to a larger P300 than the veridical feedback.  
 
Because the outcomes in the experimental tasks of these studies were not 
explicitly money-related, it could be hypothesized that the P300 is only insensitive 
to monetary rewards alone. Yet, results indicating that the monetary reward 
valence affected the amplitude of the P300 in gambling tasks have also been 
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obtained. Wu and Zhou (2009) reported that monetary wins led to larger P300 
responses than losses, but only in the condition where the outcomes were 
expected. Nevertheless reward valence was also a modulating factor of the P300 
in recently conducted experiments were outcome expectancy did not come into 
play (Leng & Zhou, 2010; Rigoni, Polezzi, Ruminati, Guarino & Sartori, 2010; with 
both experiments showing a larger P300 for monetary gains than losses). Due to 
the few studies that had been carried out, it is still a matter of debate if the P300 is 
actually influenced by reward valence, whereas it seems that reward magnitude is 
a more reliable modulator of this brain potential.  
 
1.4.2 The modulation of the P300 by interpersonal relationship and empathy 
So far the research regarding the question if and how the P300 is being influenced 
by interpersonal relationship and whether this supposed relation could be an 
indicator for empathy, similar to the possible role of the FRN on that matter, is 
rather scarce. Only one article directly accessed this question. The study was 
looking for the effects that playing for different agents in a gambling task had on 
the amplitudes of the FRN and the P300 (Leng & Zhou, 2010). In three conditions 
subjects either played for themselves, for a friend or for a stranger. Doing the 
gambling task, subjects received at the onset of every trial information for whom 
they were playing. After they received a feedback about the monetary outcome of 
the trial, subjects had to allocate that outcome to the agent in question. A 
significant effect for agency was detected concerning the P300, showing the 
largest amplitude in the self-execution condition and the second largest amplitude 
in the friend-observation condition. The differential P300 responses caused by 
interpersonal relationship may be mediated by empathy for the experience of 
others. What makes this claim viable is the distinction between friend and stranger 
by the P300, which is in line with the assumption that people care more about their 
friends than they care about strangers.  
The P300 is also assumed to reflect attention allocation (Polich, 2007) and it is 
possible that subjects are motivated to engage their attentional resources towards 
themselves and their friends, but not as much towards strangers. Bradley (2009) 
stated that the P300 is sensitive to stimuli of “motivational relevance”. Other 
researchers suggested that the P300 is concerned with the “significance” of stimuli 
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(Donchin, 1981) and the “meaning” of stimuli (Johnson, 1986). All these properties 
of the P300 could explain why this brain potential is sensitive to stimuli that evoke 
feelings of empathy for the misfortune of others, but very little is known so far, how 
the P300 and empathy are related.  
 
The notion that a larger P300 potentially reflects a process of empathy is 
supported by other researchers as well. Fan and Han (2008) for instance, report a 
larger P300 for people who watched images with pain-related content, compared 
to the P300 that was evoked when they observed neutral images. Han, Fan and 
Mao (2008) replicated these findings using the same image material and 
additionally found a gender difference with females producing a larger P300 for 
painful stimuli than men. Another difference in brain potentials was observed 
between controls and physicians when they were viewing painful stimuli (image of 
needle stitching a body part) and non-painful stimuli (image of Q-tip touching a 
body part) (Decety, Yang & Cheng, 2010). The controls showed significantly larger 
P300 for the painful stimuli than for the neutral stimuli, whereas physicians did not 
differ in their electrophysiological response to both kinds of stimuli. Decety et al. 
(2010) suggested that this could be interpreted by a down-regulation of empathy 
for pain in a group of people that is repeatedly exposed to the suffering of others.  
 
1.5 Own research outline  
The study presented in this work tries to integrate many aspects of some of the 
experiments described here earlier. One major aim of this endeavor is to render 
evidence for the notion that the FRN and the P300 are epiphenomena of a neural 
mechanism for empathy. Some investigators purported the idea that the FRN/ERN 
may play a role in the processing of empathy (e.g. Miltner et al., 2003; Fukushima 
& Hiraki, 2006; 2009) and a few others attempted to link the P300 to empathy (e.g. 
Fan & Han, 2008; Decety et al., 2010). Up to now no one has reported an agency 
effect for both ERPs in one single experiment in order to indicate neural responses 
to this emotional process. Whether this is due to the fact that only one of those 
brain potentials is actually involved in empathy-processing or whether empathy is 
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generated in the brain in a too complex way that it could be determined by the 
occurrence of a single ERP alone, still bears explanation.  
 
With the intent to replicate previous findings regarding the FRN and P300 
responses in monetary gambling tasks, the study design from Itagaki and 
Katayama (2008) was adapted and slightly modified. This design allowed testing, if 
monetary losses, compared to monetary wins, would elicit a larger FRN that 
should peak approximately between 200 – 300 ms after feedback-stimulus onset. 
Since the first discovery of the FRN by Miltner et al. (1997) this negative feedback-
related signal was found in several studies, therefore it is expected to also occur in 
the new study. Itagaki and Katayama’s (2008) design also incorporated playing for 
other agents. This feature was used to examine if the observed monetary losses of 
affiliated people would evoke an FRN, but not the losses of an institution. In line 
with other studies that investigated losses observed from others, the FRN should 
be evoked by losses of affiliated others but with a smaller amplitude than the own 
losses of the subject that performs on the task. On the other hand, the FRN should 
not be sensitive to the losses of an institution (the Austrian National Bank). This 
institution has been chosen as a quasi-neutral agent. The underlying hypothesis 
was that people cared for their own losses and for the losses of friends but not for 
the (small) losses of the Austrian National Bank in a gambling task (comparable to 
the results obtained by Fukushima & Hiraki, 2009). After prior research showed 
that the FRN for losses of others was not seen for the observation of strangers 
and computer agents, it was assumed that the FRN would also be absent even if 
the agent was an existing institution that everyone knew.  
 
In addition, a similar modulating effect that outcome valence (wins or losses) and 
agency (“self”, “affiliated person” and “institution”) has on the FRN is also expected 
for the P300. Hence the P300 should be larger for wins than for losses (Wu & 
Zhou, 2009; Leng & Zhou, 2010; Rigoni et al, 2010) and reveal the largest 
amplitude for the self-condition and the second largest for affiliated person-
observation-condition (Leng & Zhou, 2010). The P300 should differentiate 
between oneself and the two other agents by allocating more attentional resources 
to self-relevant stimuli. This attentional focus should be largest for the subjects’ 
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own outcomes (because they probably regard their own outcomes as more 
relevant than the outcomes of others), smaller for close others and smallest for the 
Austrian National Bank (because the outcomes of close others should still matter 
to the subjects, whereas the outcomes of the OeNB should not).  
 
In respect of the previous research the gambling task of the new study differs in 
two ways. First, when subjects view the outcomes of an affiliated person, they 
don’t sit next to them (e.g. Fukushima & Hiraki, 2006; 2009) or get informed about 
their outcomes via a computer network; instead they play for the affiliated person 
by proxy. Second, the third agent in the gambling task (beside “self” and “affiliated 
person”) is neither a stranger (e.g. Leng & Zhou, 2010) nor a computer agent (e.g. 
Fukushima & Hiraki, 2006, 2009) but a well-known Austrian institution: the 
Austrian National Bank.  
 
To further corroborate the hypothesis that empathy for the losses of affiliated 
others is responsible for the different ERP amplitudes in different task conditions 
two empathy questionnaires and one psychopathy questionnaire will be handed 
out to the subjects. According to expectations, higher empathy scores from both 
empathy questionnaires should go along with larger FRNs for losses and larger 
P300s for wins in the affiliated-person-condition and higher scores in the cold-
heartedness scale of the psychopathy questionnaire should go along with smaller 
FRNs for losses and smaller P300s for wins in the affiliated-person-condition. 
Finally, it is assumed that the neural generator of the FRN would be found in the 













Twenty-four right-handed male and female subjects took part in the experiment. 
Four of them had to be excluded from further data analysis due to excessive 
electroocular- and electromyogram-artifacts in their EEG recordings. The twenty 
remaining subjects (6 males and 14 females) ranged in age between 20 to 30 
years, with a mean age of 24.95 (SD = 2.4). They participated on a voluntary 
basis, and didn’t receive any monetary compensation. Handedness was assessed 
using the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). All subjects had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None of them had reported any history of 
psychiatric or neurological disorders. Prior to the experiment, written informed 
consent was obtained from the subjects.  
 
2.1.2 Task and procedure 
Subjects sat comfortably in front of a 19’’ CRT (Sony GDM-F520) screen with a 
viewing distance of approximately 80 cm in a dimly lit and sound-attenuated room. 
Visual stimuli were presented using E-prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tool, Inc.) 
Subjects either played for themselves, or played by proxy for one of two agents: 
an “affiliated person” – a well-known person which the subject values very much, 
or the National Bank of Austria (abbreviated with “OeNB” for the German 
expression “Oesterreichische Nationalbank”). Thus, there were three main 
conditions: 
 
1) The self-condition: 
2) The person-condition (short for “affiliated-person”)  




The stimuli and sequence were based on the gambling task design of Itagaki and 
Katayama (2008) which was slightly modified. The trial procedure started with the 
presentation of a fixation cross in the middle of the screen that remained there for 
the whole duration of the EEG recording. It only vanished during the breaks and 
reappeared thereafter. At the beginning of each trial a headline was presented, 
informing the subjects for which agent they were playing. The headline kept its 
position till the end of the trial. Underneath the headline, two white cards, also 
centered in the middle of the screen, appeared at trial-onset; one at the right-hand 
side and the other at the left hand side of the fixation cross. Each card had the 
size of 6.7 x 6.7 cm and was presented in front of a white background. Subjects 
were required to select one of the cards by pressing a keyboard button with the 
index finger of their right hand. After the button-press, the respective card was 
framed to accentuate the selected option, for the duration of 1000 ms. 
Subsequently the card was either highlighted in green displaying “+100” in white 
font, indicating a (virtual) win of 100 Euros, or in red displaying “-100” in white font, 
which showed that 100 Euros had been (virtually) lost. The sequence within one 
trial is displayed in Figure 4. Because subjects did not actually receive their 
cumulated outcomes after the experiment had ended, the wins and losses from 
the gambling task were merely hypothetical.  
 
Subjects were instructed to imagine that the wins and losses they perceive were 
wins and losses of the agents of the respective conditions. Names of the affiliated 
persons had to be given in advance from the subjects, and were inserted into the 
set of the presented stimuli. As a further part of the instructions, subjects were 
called upon to try to maximize their gain (as well as the gains of the other agents) 
and were informed that they are allowed to use any strategy they might find helpful 
to accomplish this goal. Effectively there was no such strategy that could have 
been applied, because the probability of wins and losses was equally 50%, 
appearing in a random order to control the frequency of the feedback stimuli. The 
implication of the instruction that during the gambling task strategies may be 
applied to maximize the gains should make sure that subjects remained motivated. 
A similar instruction was used by Gehring & Willoughby (2002) to facilitate 
motivation in a monetary gambling task. The trials also occurred in a random order 
to exclude order effects.  
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Figure 4: Timeline of two example trials. a) win-trial of the self-condition b) loss-trial of the 
affiliated-person-condition, who in this case goes by the name Martin. 
 
After every 100 trials, subjects received a false feedback about the relative gains 
of each agent. These feedbacks were presented for the duration of 10 seconds, 
prior to each one of the breaks in the EEG recording and consisted of three 
sentences. A typical feedback, for example, was:  
 
You won more than the OeNB; Martin won more than you. 
Martin won more than the OeNB and you. 
The OeNB won the least amount of money 
 
Here, Martin is an example of a name of the affiliated person. The information in 
the feedbacks was counterbalanced within one experiment, so that the subjects 
thought that the amount of money that each agent won or lost differed between 
trial blocks. Those feedbacks did not reflect the actual gains in each condition. 
This was to prevent that subjects recognized too easily that wins and losses 
occurred with an equal probability if a feedback had given them the correct 
accounts of wins and losses. The whole experiment consisted of 600 trials with 
five breaks after every 100 trials and lasted approximately 60 minutes. 
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2.1.3 Apparatus and EEG recordings 
Electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded using a 64-channel low-input 
impedance amplifier (Ing. Kurt Zickler GmbH, Pfaffstätten, Austria). The 59 
Ag/AgCl electrodes were imbedded in an elastic electrode cap (EASYCAP GmbH, 
Germany) equidistantly positioned to each other (montage M10). The individual 3D 
electrode coordinates on the cap of every subject were measured with a 
photogrammetric head digitizer (3D PHD; Bauer, Lamm, Holzreiter, Holländer, 
Leodolter & Leodolter, 2000). To this end, light markers were attached to electrode 
sockets of 17 pre-defined positions on the cap, prior to the EEG recording 
procedure. Twelve calibrated cameras simultaneously took pictures of the 
subject’s head from different angles. The 17 light-marked positions were captured 
and the remaining electrode positions were reconstructed via interpolation. 
Afterwards, to record the potential produced by vertical eye movements, two 
electrooculogram (EOG) electrodes were placed above and underneath the left 
eye, with both centers being in line with the subject’s pupil if he or she looked 
straight forward. To control for horizontal eye movements, two EOG electrodes 
were additionally placed at the outer canthi of each eye. The ground electrode was 
placed onto the forehead. To make sure that any potential that was not caused by 
electro-cortical activity was subtracted from the scalp electrodes, a reference was 
used consisting of an electrode placed on the sternal end of the right clavicle and 
another electrode placed on the “vertebra prominens”, the 7th cervical vertebrae. 
The impedances of all electrodes in use were kept below 3 kΩ by slightly 
scratching the skin at each electrode position and filling the ring-electrodes with an 
air-vacuumed electrode-gel (Electrode-Cap International, Inc., Eaton/Ohio; USA). 
Recorded EEG signals were within a frequency range of 0.1 – 125 Hz and were 








2.1.4 Questionnaires  
Batson-Scale 
Directly after the EEG recording procedure three personality questionnaires were 
handed out to the subjects. The first questionnaire was the German version of the 
Batson-Scale (original English version: Batson, Fultz & Schoenrade, 1987) and 
was given to the subjects while they were still sitting in the EEG recording room. 
The Batson-Scale comprises several adjectives from which six belong to the 
“empathetic concern scale” (e.g. the German words for: sympathetic, moved, 
compassionate) another eight make up the “personal distress scale” (e. g. the 
German words for: alarmed, grieved, upset) and the remaining items are filler 
items. On the questionnaire subjects were requested to describe the emotions 
they felt when a monetary loss on the gambling task was being observed. For that, 
they had to make a cross on a scale, next to each adjective, ranging from 1 (“not a 
bit”) to 7 (“extremely”). The Batson-Scale came in three versions, one for each 
main condition (self, person and bank). 
 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)  
The German version of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (original English version: 
Davis, 1996) was presented outside the recording room and was filled out during 
the detaching of the cap and the external electrodes. This empathy questionnaire 
consists of 28 items in form of statements that have to be agreed or disagreed with 
on a scale from 1 (“does not describe me well”) to 5 (“describes me very well”). 
The four scales of the IRI are labeled “empathetic concern scale”, “perspective-
taking scale”, “fantasy scale” and “personal distress scale” and they consist of 
seven items each.  
 
Psychopathic Personality Inventory – Revised (PPI-R) 
The last questionnaire was the German translation of the Psychopathic Personality 
Inventory – Revised (Alpers & Eisenbarth, 2008). In contrast to the other two, 
which are empathy questionnaires, the PPI-R contains eight psychopathy-relevant 
scales and one validity scale. Only the “cold-heartedness scale” was used for 
further analysis, because cold-heartedness is thought to be the opposite of 
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empathy (Alpers & Eisenbarth, 2008). Still, subjects were required to fill out the 
whole questionnaire to exclude item-order effects. The cold-heartedness scale 
consists of 15 items of self-describing statements, on which subjects had to rate 
on a scale from 1 (false) to 4 (true) whether the statement was an accurate 
description of their personality or not.  
 
2.1.5 Data analysis  
 
EOG movement and blink correction 
The EOG electrodes record the electrical potential produced by eye movements 
that also disperses into other scalp channels thus creating artifacts. Therefore 
these EOG artifacts were removed by successive subtraction of the weights of the 
vertical and horizontal EOG’s. Prior to the experiment, a vertical and a horizontal 
eye-movement task were used to calculate those weights as the ratio of the 
covariance between each EEG channel and the EOG (Fretska, Bauer, Leodolter, 
M. & Leodolter, 1999). Thus, the algorithm reads as follows: 
 
c 




Here, c denotes the calculated correction factor, Cov marks the covariance 
between the EEG signal at channel k and the EOG and Var stands for the 
variance within both EOG channels.  
 
Eye-blinks occur frequently during EEG recordings and create another source of 
EOG artifacts that need to be corrected. To this end, the time windows that 
contained blinks were identified using a template matching procedure. Blink 
correction coefficients were calculated for each EEG channel using the previously 
identified time windows by means of linear regression. The time windows 
containing blinks were then corrected based on the blink correction coefficients 
(Lamm, Fischmeister & Bauer, 2005) 
28 
EEG analysis 
EEG data were imported into EEGLAB 6.03b (Delorme & Makeig, 2004), a toolbox 
imbedded in Matlab 7.5.0 (The MathWorks, Inc.). A finite impulse response (FIR) 
low-pass filter with a cut-off frequency of 30Hz was applied to get rid of mains hum 
and other high-frequency electrical noise. To exclude artifactual trials, a semi-
automated artifact-rejection procedure using the combination of three algorithms to 
assist visual inspection was applied. If the trials met at least one of the following 
criteria they were marked and removed after visual inspection: a voltage 
exceeding the threshold of +/- 75 µV, a linear voltage drift with a slope exceeding 
the threshold of 50 µV and if the probability for the occurrence of a single channel 
or a whole trial was low based on a standard deviation of 5. Additional criteria for 
the removal of trials that contained artifacts, but were not detected by the 
algorithms, were noise or drifts in the baseline, as well as artifacts caused by 
muscular and eye-blink activity, within the first 700 ms after feedback onset. Those 
additional criteria were checked via visual inspection of the data and trials that met 
the criteria were removed. As a result of this procedure, four subjects had to be 
excluded from further analysis due to excessive artifacts. 
 
ERP analysis 
Before filtering the data and artifact-rejection, the ongoing signals were epoched, 
extracting the time domain from 200 ms before feedback-onset, which constituted 
the baseline, and 1300 ms thereafter.  
 
Because there were three main conditions (self-condition, person-condition and 
bank-condition) and two outcome possibilities (win or loss), six conditions, by 










Artifact-corrected trials were first averaged for each of the six conditions (self-loss, 
self-win etc.) per subject (averages) and then for all subjects per condition (grand 
means). Prior to peak-detection, all averages were visually inspected to find the 
respective time domains of the FRN and the P300 using a peak-detection tool 
implemented in EEGLAB that enabled to examine ERP averages of single 
channels. Using this tool the FRN was found within 184 – 332 ms after feedback-
onset and was assessed at electrode Fz. This electrode channel was used 
because the FRN was most strongly pronounced at Fz, judging from the grand 
mean waveforms. Instead of merely using the highest negative peak of the FRN, it 
was quantified as the base-to-peak difference between the FRN and the average 
amplitude of the immediately preceding and following positive peak according to 
the following formula (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004): 
 
1. positive peak  P300 peak 
2
  FRN 
 
The P300, assessed at electrode location Pz using the same peak-detection tool, 
was found by means of visual inspection within 268 – 496 ms. The electrode was 
chosen because the P300 was most strongly pronounced at Pz.  
 
Statistical analysis 
Visual inspection of the simultaneously plotted grand means from all six conditions 
provided first insight which conditions showed apparent differences in regard of 
their ERP peak amplitudes and therefore helped to narrow down the choice of the 
statistical procedures that should be applied. The grand means clearly 
demonstrated that a significant effect on the FRN could not be expected since the 
peak voltages of all conditions were located too close to each other. Hence the 
FRN was not further analyzed and statistical calculations that were carried out, 
only concerned the P300 at electrode location Pz.  
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Three mixed design 3x2x2 ANOVA’s were calculated, all of them having the same 
within-subject factors: agency (self, person and bank) and outcome (win, loss). For 
the between-subject factors, results of different scales from the personality 
questionnaires were taken to divide subjects into two groups for each scale 
respectively. Based on the empathetic concern scale of the IRI and the Batson-
Scale (in the affiliated-person version) subjects were split-up, according to the 
median of the scores, into a high-empathy group (above median) and a low-
empathy group (below median). The cold-heartedness score of the PPI-R was 
used in the same manner to create a cold-hearted (above median) and a warm-
hearted (below median) group. Thus, the between-group factors were: empathy 
IRI, empathy Batson-Scale and cold-heartedness. Additionally simple contrasts 
were computed to indicate the direction of significant main- and interaction-effects. 
To test if the assumptions for a repeated measurement ANOVA with a between-
subject factor were met, Mauchly’s test for the assumption of sphericity and 
Levene’s test for the assumption of homogeneity of variances were calculated. 
Because Levene’s test was significant for two of the three between-subject factors, 
the raw data of the dependent variable have been log-transformed and all 
ANOVAS plus the tests for the assumptions have been calculated again.  
 
Standardized low resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) 
The sLORETA software was used for the localization of neural activity (Pascual-
Marqui, 2002). In short, sLORETA attempts to solve the inverse problem of 
locating the current density distribution that arises from post-synaptic activity 
(initial state), based only on the measurement of electrical potentials from scalp 
electrodes (final state). Although there is no unique solution to inverse problems in 
brain imaging, Pascual-Marqui (2002) claims that sLORETA has zero localization 
error. sLORETA solutions are restricted to cortical grey matter and hippocampus. 
Calculations resulted in a spherical head model registered to the Talairach human 
brain atlas (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988), available as digitized MRI from the Brain 
Imaging Centre, Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI). Images of brain activity 
thus created contain 6430 voxels at 5 mm spatial resolution (Pascual-Marqui, 
2002).  
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In order to view the maximal neural activation for all six conditions, grand means 
for sLORETA were computed, averaging the time domain of 1 to 1300 ms after 
feedback-onset into 13 timeframes of 100 ms each. For all sLORETA data files a 
signal-to-noise ratio of 1 to 100, as a regulatory parameter, was selected.  
 
Statistical non-parametric Mapping (SnPM) 
The SnPM tool (Holmes, Blair, Watson & Ford, 1996) is integrated into the 
sLORETA software and offers a way of calculating the difference between two 
sets of tomographic data, without having to meet the assumptions required for a t-
test. Hence SnPM is also referred to as a “pseudo t-test”. It uses a voxel by voxel 
nonparametric randomization procedure (carrying out 5000 permutations) to test 
the null-hypothesis if e.g. two conditions are the same.  
 
After the statistical analysis of ERP peak amplitudes and questionnaire results the 
following conditions were compared in separate pairwise SnPM-tests: high-
empathy vs. low-empathy (according to the median split of empathetic concern 
scale results from the IRI), self vs. person and person vs. bank. These 
comparisons have been chosen after the ANOVAS revealed significant differences 
between the high- and low-empathy group (between-subject factor: empathy IRI) 
and a significant main-effect for agency with significant differences between self 
vs. person and person vs. bank. For all of these comparisons averages were 
created, merging together all the conditions per person for the first comparison 
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ANOVA with between-subject factor: cold-heartedness 
Finally the last ANOVA replicated again the result that the factor agency was 
significant (F2,36 = 8.866, p = .001), with the factor-level person having the highest 
P300 amplitude, followed by self and bank. The simple contrast comparisons 
uncovered once more that the difference between self and person was significant 
(F1,18 = 7.262, p = .015) as well as the difference between bank and person (F1,18 = 
16.748, p = .002).  
The between-subject factor cold-heartedness did not reach significance; hence 
subjects did not differ in their P300 peaks in regard to that factor. All remaining 
effects and interactions were also not significant.  
 
2.2.2 sLORETA: source analysis 
The neural activation patterns of the grand means from all six conditions were 
inspected across three time frames (in sum: 200 – 500 ms after feedback-onset). 
This time domain was chosen to examine the activation during the occurrence of 
both, the FRN and the P300. Overall, the tomographic images of the neural 
activations looked quite similar for all conditions within the observed time frames. 
No activity in the ACC was found within the time frame of interest (200 – 300 ms). 
Table 1 presents the strongest activated region within those three time frames for 
all conditions.  
 
2.2.3 SnPM: activation differences 
To examine if the differences in P300 peak amplitudes between high and low 
empathetic persons would also be reflected in differences of their current density, 
two groups (high empathy IRI and low empathy IRI) were compared in a pairwise 
SnPM test. Because the P300 occurred within a rather wide latency range (268 – 
496 ms) the time frames 4 (300 – 400 ms) and 5 (400 – 500 ms) were inspected. 
The reason why time frame 3 (200 – 300 ms) was omitted from inspection was 
that only one subject had a P300 peak that occurred before 300 ms after stimulus 
onset. However, the comparison did not reach significance for those two time 
frames.  
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Permutation tests for the comparison of the agency-levels self and person also 
turned out to be non- significant in the relevant time frames.  
 
Condition TF’s in ms Most activated anatomical region MNI coordinates 
 
self-loss 
200 - 300 Superior Frontal Gyrus (BA 6) X=5, Y=30, Z=60 
300 - 400 Superior Frontal Gyrus (BA 6) X=5, Y=20, Z=65 
400 - 500 Postcentral Gyrus (BA 3) X=45, Y=-20, Z=65 
 
self-win 
200 - 300 Superior Frontal Gyrus (BA 6) X=10, Y=30, Z=60 
300 - 400 Superior Frontal Gyrus (BA 6) X=5, Y=5, Z=70 




200 - 300 Superior Frontal Gyrus (BA 6) X=5, Y=30, Z=60 
300 - 400 Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA 6) X=55, Y=5, Z=45 




200 - 300 Medial Frontal Gyrus (BA 9) X=-5, Y=55, Z=40 
300 - 400 Superior Frontal Gyrus (BA 6) X=5, Y=5, Z=70 




200 - 300 Superior Frontal Gyrus (BA 8) X=15, Y=30, Z=60 
300 - 400 Superior Frontal Gyrus (BA 6) X=10, Y=10, Z=70 
400 - 500 Postcentral Gyrus (BA 1) X=55, Y=-20, Z=55 
 
bank-win 
200 - 300 Superior Frontal Gyrus (BA 8) X=5, Y=30, Z=60 
300 - 400 Superior Frontal Gyrus (BA 6) X=10, Y=10, Z=70 
400 - 500 Postcentral Gyrus (BA 1) X=55, Y=-20, Z=55 
Table 1: The neural areas are shown that were most strongly activated within the time domain of 
the occurrence of the FRN and P300 with the associated Brodmann area in parenthesis. TF is 
short for “time frame” and show the respective time frames in milliseconds (ms). Coordinates stem 
from the Montreal Neurological Institute. 
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The last non-parametric test yielded a significant difference for the agency-levels 
person and bank within the time intervals of 200 – 300 ms, 300 – 400 ms and 400 
– 500 ms. Because the current density differences in the time domain of the P300 
was of interest, only the time domain of 300 – 500 ms was inspected. In the 
interval of 300 – 400 ms following feedback onset, many voxels were found to be 
significantly more activated for person than for bank. A voxel reached significance 
when he was above the t-value of 6.040 for p <.05. Table 2 displays all significant 
voxels with their number and anatomical region and Figure 11 depicts the 
corresponding tomographic image of the neural activation pattern. A list with the 
exact coordinates of all activated regions can be seen in the appendix.  
 
Voxel number Activated anatomical region 
12 Inferior Parietal Lobule (BA 40) 
9 Superior Temporal Gyrus (BA 41, BA 42, BA 22) 
6 Insula (BA 13) 
3 Precuneus (BA 7) 
3 Postcentral Gyrus (BA 40) 
1 Inferior Temporal Gyrus (BA 20) 
Table 2: Comparison between person and bank in the interval of 300 – 400 ms. The activated 
anatomical regions are listed together with the number of significant voxels therein.  
 
 
Figure 11: Tomographic image of the activated regions shown in Table 2. Yellow colored voxels 
mark the points of highest activation differences for person compared to bank. 
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In the time interval of 400 – 500 ms activation in the inferior and middle frontal 
gyrus was higher for person than for bank. Table 3 and Figure 12 display the 
significantly more activated regions in the same manner as shown for the time 
interval of 300 – 400 ms. Again significant voxels were those that had a t-value 
that was above the threshold of 6.040 for p > .05. 
 
Voxel quantity Activated anatomical region 
10 Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 47, BA 10) 
10 Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA 11, BA 47) 
Table 3: Comparison between person and bank in the interval of 400- 500 ms.  
 
 














The main hypotheses of this diploma study were that own losses in a monetary 
gambling task would lead to a larger FRN than own wins, and that a similar FRN-
effect, even though with a smaller amplitude, would also be apparent if losses from 
close others were observed, whereas this effect should be non-existent if subjects 
observed losses from an institution. In the study design subjects did not directly 
observe the outcomes of other players, but instead played for them by proxy. 
Furthermore it was expected that the P300 would be larger for own wins, 
compared to own losses and larger for the observed wins of close others, 
compared to observed losses of close others, again with the absence of this 
observation P300-effect when observing the outcomes of an institution. 
Personality questionnaires were used to test the assumption that both ERP-effects 
were related to empathy. Finally, it was expected that the ACC would be activated 
in the time interval where the FRN occurred with a higher activation for losses than 
for wins.  
 
3.1 FRN 
Although numerous studies showed that the FRN was more pronounced for 
monetary losses than for monetary gains (e.g. Miltner et al, 1997; Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004) and some found that FRN peak 
amplitude was larger for self-referred losses than for observed losses from others 
(e.g. Fukushima & Hiraki, 2006, 2009; Yu & Zhou, 2006), the results of the study 
presented here weren’t able to support either of those findings. That the FRN was 
not larger for monetary losses in the self-execution condition seemed to be 
particularly surprising at first sight. Despite the variation in results attained from 
monetary gambling tasks, losses constantly led to larger FRNs compared to gains. 
All prior studies, however, used monetary compensation for participation in the 
experiment and often additionally incorporated payment depending on 
performance on the task. In the present study subjects didn’t receive any money 
and there was no strategy to apply to increase the gains, which might have 
lowered the subjects’ motivation. This thought is in line with the circumstance that 
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many subjects reported post-experimentally that they had felt as if no such 
strategy existed. The notion that the FRN/MFN is influenced by motivational 
factors in the way that less motivated people have significantly decreased 
FRN/MFN amplitudes has found support in recent studies (Masaki et al., 2006; 
Goyer, et al., 2008). For the ERN the same motivational effect has been put 
forward (Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer & Donchin 1993; Luu, Collins & Tucker, 
2000; Taylor et al., 2006). Finally, it was also suggested that the proposed 
generator of both, ERN and FRN – the ACC, is influenced by affect and motivation 
(Bush et al., 2000). Thus a lack of motivation and a disinterest in the task (as was 
mentioned from some participants as well) could explain why feedback valence 
(gain/loss) had no influence on FRN peak amplitude. What speaks against that 
conclusion is the fact that the FRN was apparent in all conditions, thus it could be 
argued that the subjects actually were motivated and that there was merely no 
difference in motivation between the conditions. Another explanation for the 
absence of a feedback valence effect would be that because there was no 
strategy to apply, subjects did neither expect losses nor wins. That feedback-
expectancy influences the amplitude of the FRN was demonstrated in prior studies 
(e.g. Holroyd & Krigolson, 2007). 
 
Concerning the question why the FRN did not differ for conditions where subjects 
observed their own outcomes and where they observed the outcomes of others in 
a gambling task, only one study from Leng and Zhou (2010) has come to similar 
results. Leng and Zhou could not find a difference between the FRN responses to 
the losses of friends and strangers, even though the subjects’ own losses were 
significantly larger than their own wins. The authors try to explain this finding by 
proposing that the FRN, as an early component that reflects outcome evaluation, 
is incapable of distinguishing between friend and stranger and only manages to 
differentiate between self and others. Backed up by studies that showed that the 
observational-FRN was only elicited because the losses of others had a direct 
impact on one’s own gains (Fukushima & Hiraki, 2006; Itagaki & Katayama, 2008) 
and by referring to theories that differentiate between automatic and controlled 
processing (for example described by Fazio, 2001), their explanation sounds 
rather tempting. However, this explanation disregards cases in which an 
observational-FRN was apparent in studies where the outcomes of other agents 
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were not associated with the subjects own benefits (Fukushima & Hiraki, 2009). 
Further studies are needed to shed light on this finding from Leng and Zhou 
(2010).  
 
In order to explain why there was no agency-effect in the present study, one 
should keep in mind that this was the first experiment ever conducted where 
subjects clearly knew that they were not observing the performances of others, but 
merely played by proxy for the two non-self agents instead. One question, 
amongst others, was to find out if to imagine a friend or a relative was already 
sufficient enough to evoke a larger FRN after a monetary loss has been 
“observed”. The results present in this study would suggest that this is not the 
case, although a lack of an agency-effect could in turn be explained by a lack of 
motivation during task-execution. If not even own losses in the game were relevant 
to the subjects than it is not surprising that subjects were also indifferent to the 
losses of others.  
 
3.2 P300 
Like in the studies from Yeung and Sanfey (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004, 2005) the 
P300 was also insensitive to reward valence in the present study. In contrast to 
the study of Yeung and Sanfey (2004), reward magnitude was not a factor in the 
presented study, due to gains and losses being of equal amount (+100/-100) in the 
trials. The results from Yeung and Sanfey (2004; 2005) and from the study 
presented here seem to stand alone because other scientists consistently reported 
the P300 to be affected by feedback valence (see the following examples). In 
regard to that matter, it is noteworthy, that the findings how the P300 responds to 
feedback valence diverge among different studies. Ito, Larsen, Smith and 
Cacioppo (1998) argued in favor of a negativity bias of the brain resulting in a 
larger P300 for negative visual stimuli. Hajcak et al. (2005) reported an increase of 
the P300 caused by positive feedback, irrespective of feedback expectancy, 
whereas a larger P300-response to false feedback after correct task-performance 
was found by Balconi and Crivelli (2010). In monetary gambling games, however, 
gains have, so far, consistently led to a more positive going P300 (Leng & Zhou, 
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2010; Rigoni, et al., 2010). Yeung and Sanfey (2004) initially proposed separate 
processing mechanisms for reward magnitude and reward valence, but it is difficult 
to give credence to this idea in light of the fact that contradicting evidence from 
different sources exists.  
 
How do these findings fit together with the fact that the P300 was significantly 
more pronounced when subjects played for close others than when they played for 
themselves or for the Austrian National Bank? The P300 is thought to reflect 
mechanisms of attentional allocation (Linden, 2005), with a larger response to 
motivationally significant events (Nieuwenhuis, et al., 2005a). Recall memory for 
words has also been linked to the P300 in a study where larger P300 amplitudes 
were associated with subjects’ attention to words that have been learned 
beforehand (Curran, 2004). Perhaps subjects were emotionally involved when 
they viewed the labels of different agents on the screen. Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal 
and Deldin (2004) found out that autobiographical self-relevant stimuli, such as 
one’s own name, elicited a much larger P300 than other names. In their study 
words of different categories were presented to the subjects sequentially. There 
was always one self-relevant word sharing the same physical properties (word 
length and color) with most of the non self-relevant words. Some of these non self-
relevant words were in red font and the subjects were instructed explicitly to draw 
their attention only to those red target-words. Notwithstanding this instruction the 
self-relevant words in black font elicited a larger P300 than non self-relevant words 
in black font. Moreover, Gray et al. (2004) predicted that stimuli with 
autobiographical information about close others (e.g. romantic partners) would 
elicit a larger P300 as well. This finding is compatible with results for the P300 in 
the present study. The circumstance that subjects showed the highest P300 peak 
when observing the names of the close person may be caused by the fact that the 
name of this person was explicitly presented on the screen, whereas the name of 
the subject who was playing was not (instead they were informed: “You are 
playing for yourself”). 
 
Another result of this study was that subjects who were more empathetic had 
larger P300 peaks. It may be the case that this ERP reflects a mechanism of 
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empathy processing, but in earlier research, scientists only came to that 
conclusion when the P300 was susceptible to the observation of gains of close 
others, but not to the gains of strangers (Leng & Zhou, 2010) or to the viewing of 
pain-related stimuli (e.g. Decety et al., 2010). Leng and Zhou’s study differs from 
the present study in regard to the observation of the outcomes from the agents: 
whereas Leng and Zhou’s subjects viewed the gains and losses of actual co-
players on the screen, subjects in the present study had to play by proxy for the 
other agents. The process of imagining that observed outcomes were those of the 
respective agents probably did not suffice to create an emotional response that 
would be reflected in the P300. Decety et al., like in the present study also used 
questionnaires (e.g. the Interpersonal Reactivity Index –IRI) to examine if larger 
P300 responses from the control group go along with higher empathy scores. 
Unlike in the present study, subjects with higher P300 amplitudes (control group) 
did not differ from subjects with lower P300 amplitudes (physicians) in regard to 
their empathy scores. Both groups only differed in the evaluation of how they 
perceived the pain intensity and how unpleasant they felt when observing pain-
related images. Thus, the P300 in Decety et al.’s study may reflect only 
differences in empathy that were restricted to pain-related stimuli. In contrast, the 
higher P300 amplitudes in the present study are related to higher scores in 
empathy questionnaires and therefore probably indicate a more general 
empathetic response. However, larger P300 peaks were not associated with the 
observation of positive or negative events of others in any kind in the present 
study. It is therefore assumed that the P300 which was larger in empathetic people 
across all conditions is explained by the fact that these people paid more attention 
to the monetary gambling task in general.  
 
Contrary to the results of many earlier studies, the ACC was not found to be more 
activated in the time domain of the FRN. In the interval of the P300 (300 – 500 ms) 
the following regions were activated across all conditions in 300 – 400 ms: 
superior frontal gyrus (BA 6) and middle frontal gyrus (BA 6); and in 400 – 500 ms 
the highest activations were found in the postcentral gyrus (BA 3 and BA 1). The 
neural areas that generate the P3b are roughly defined as the temporal-parietal 
regions (Polich, 2007). Brodmann Area 3 and 1 are part of the parietal cortex and 
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an activation of those regions in the time window of the P300 matches the findings 
that the P300/P3b has its source there.  
The comparison between close others vs. the Austrian National Bank revealed 
consistently more activation for the former in the interval of 300 – 400 ms mostly in 
temporal-parietal regions (inferior parietal lobule (BA 40) superior temporal gyrus 
(BA 41, BA 42, and BA 22), precuneus (BA 7) and postcentral gyrus (BA 40)). 
Because the P300 was larger when playing for close others, this finding could 
further strengthen the notion that temporal-parietal regions can be considered as 
the source of this brain potential. The Brodmann area 40 is a part of the 
temporoparietal junction - a region of the brain that was (amongst other regions) 
found to be commonly activated in a non-verbal task (viewing comic strips) that 
triggered Theory of Mind- and empathy processes (Völlm, Taylor, Richardson, 
Corcoran, Stirling, McKie et al., 2006). In the interval of 400 – 500 ms, where the 
observation of the outcomes of close others again led to more activation, areas of 
activation were found in prefrontal regions (inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47, BA 10) 
and middle frontal gyrus (BA 11, BA 47)) but not in parietal-temporal ones. The 
orbitofrontal cortex (BA 10, BA 11, BA 47) is considered to be an important 
structure for sensory integration, emotional processing, hedonic experience and 
decision making that has many reciprocal projections to the ACC and the 
amygdala (Kringelbach, 2004). Evidence exists, that the orbitofrontal gyrus (BA 
11, BA 47) and precuneus (BA 7) were activated when making empathy 
judgments after reading social scenarios (Farrow, Zheng, Wilkinson, Spence, 
Deakin, Tarrier et al., 2001). Considering the findings of the present study it seems 
as if higher neural activations during the observation of outcomes of close others 
compared to the observation of the outcomes of the Austrian National Bank would 
indicate that subjects were more empathetic in the former condition. But because 
the tasks in both studies from Völlm et al. (2006) (viewing comic strips) and Farrow 
et al. (2001) (reading social scenarios and making empathy judgments) were very 
different from the monetary gambling task in the present study, the results are to 
be interpreted with caution.  
 
This is the first study that attempted to access the question whether the 
observation of losses of close persons would elicit similar FRN and P300 
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amplitudes as self-referred losses, in a playing-by-proxy paradigm. As a 
consequence it emphasizes the importance of strategies to keep subjects 
motivated throughout the entire experimental process and suggests that future 
studies with the same aim should either incorporate real co-players or make the 
subjects believe that such real co-players exist. It is further suggested that future 
studies should try to make wins and losses more salient for the subjects in order to 
receive stronger electrophysiological responses. A way of achieving this goal 
could be, for example, giving monetary incentives that are dependent on subjects’ 
performances. This would also require that subjects had the possibility to apply 
useful strategies to raise their gains. If outcomes were – at least to some degree – 
controllable, wins perhaps would be more rewarding and losses more adverse. To 
avoid that self-relevant autobiographical information (e.g. the name of a romantic 
partner) only influences the P300 when observing the outcomes of others it is 
suggested, that future experiments include the name of the player as well. 
Thereby the effect of self-relevant information on the P300 should be 
approximately the same for self-executed and observed outcomes. Finally, in 
order to facilitate the process of perspective-taking, images of people for whom 


















Recent work revealed that the FRN, a negative event related brain potential 
occurring between 200 – 300 ms after feedback-onset, was not only elicited when 
people received a negative feedback, but also when they observed others 
receiving a negative feedback. Monetary gambling tasks have frequently been 
used to investigate the observational-FRN (an FRN that is evoked by the 
observation of losses from others), whereas a monetary loss served as a negative 
feedback. In order to explain why an FRN is also elicited when observing the 
losses of others, some scientists have referred to the construct of human empathy, 
hypothesizing that people regarded the misfortune of others as similarly negative 
as their own. The P300, a positive going wave peaking between 300 – 500 ms, 
has also been shown to be modulated by different conditions in gambling tasks as 
well as by the empathetic concern of people. Prior studies required subjects to 
perform a gambling task alongside other players (or playing with others via 
network) and consecutively observing their own and the other player’s outcome. In 
contrast subjects in the present study had to play for themselves and for two other 
agents (a close person and the Austrian National Bank) by proxy. 
Electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded while subjects played a gambling task 
where they could either win or lose 100 virtual Euros per trial, for themselves or for 
the respective agents. Additionally, empathy questionnaires were handed out to 
the subjects post-experimentally to examine if larger FRN and P300 peak 
amplitudes would be found in subjects who rated themselves as highly empathetic.  
Neither outcome valence nor playing for the different agents had a significant 
effect on FRN peak amplitude. The P300, on the other hand, was modulated by 
playing for close others, but outcome valence again had no impact on this brain 
potential. Subjects with higher empathy scores in two questionnaires had 
significantly larger P300 amplitudes compared to subjects with lower empathy 
scores. The conclusion was drawn that these results were caused by the fact that 
due to the absence of a strategy to raise the gains in the task, subjects neither 
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expected losses nor wins and that the P300-effect for close others could be 
explained by an emotional reaction while reading their names on the screen.  
 
Zusammenfassung auf Deutsch 
Jüngste Studien haben gezeigt dass die FRN, ein ereigniskorreliertes Potenzial 
das einen negativen Wellenverlauf aufweist, nicht nur evoziert wurde, wenn 
Personen selbst eine negative Rückmeldung erhielten, sondern auch, wenn sie 
eine solche Rückmeldung bei anderen beobachteten. Die am häufigsten 
angewandte Methode, um die sogenannte Beobachtungs-FRN (eine FRN die 
auftritt wenn beobachtet wird das andere eine negative Rückmeldung erhalten) zu 
erforschen, stellen Glückspielaufgaben dar, bei denen finanzielle Verluste als 
negative Rückmeldung verwendet werden. Die Beobachtungs-FRN wurde von 
einigen Forschern dadurch erklärt, dass Personen empathisch auf den 
beobachteten finanziellen Verlust von anderen reagieren. Die P300, eine positive 
Welle die zwischen 300 – 500 ms maximal ist, wurde in Glücksspielaufgaben 
ebenfalls durch unterschiedliche Aufgabenbedingungen moduliert. Gleichfalls hat 
sich gezeigt, dass die P300 auf Stimuli reagiert, von denen vermutet wird, dass sie 
empathische Reaktionen auslösen. Vorangehende Studien haben die 
Beobachtungs-FRN untersucht, indem sie ein Design benutzten bei dem zwei 
Spieler sich entweder gegenseitig beobachten konnten, und jeder die 
Spielergebnisse des anderen Spielers sah, oder bei dem eine Versuchsperson die 
Ergebnisse des 2. Spielers am eigenen Bildschirm mit verfolgte. In der 
vorliegenden Studie hingegen spielten die Versuchspersonen für sich selbst und, 
in Stellvertretung, für zwei weitere Parteien (eine nahestehende Person und die 
Österreichische Nationalbank). EEG Signale wurden abgeleitet, während 
Versuchspersonen in einer Glückspielaufgabe 100 virtuelle Euro (pro Runde) für 
sich selbst bzw. für eine der beiden Parteien gewannen oder verloren. Zusätzlich 
wurden Empathie-Fragebögen vorgegeben, um zu untersuchen, ob sich hoch-
empathische von niedrig-empathischen Personen in ihren Gehirnpotenzialen 
unterscheiden. Die FRN unterschied sich weder in der Gewinn- bzw. 
Verlustbedingung, noch hatte das Spielen für eine der drei Parteien einen 
signifikanten Einfluss auf ihre Amplitude. Für welche Partei gespielt wurde, hatte 
allerdings einen Einfluss auf die P300, die sich ebenfalls nicht durch die Valenz 
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des Spielausgangs modulieren ließ. Die P300 war am größten wenn für die 
nahestehende Person gespielt wurde, unabhängig von beobachteten Gewinnen 
oder Verlusten. Am zweithöchsten war die ereigniskorrelierte Komponente wenn 
Versuchspersonen für sich selbst spielen und am dritthöchsten wenn sie für die 
Österreichische Nationalbank spielten. Zusätzlich wiesen hoch-empathische 
Personen eine höhere P300 auf als niedrig-empathische Personen. Die 
Ergebnisse wurden dahingehend interpretiert, dass aufgrund des Fehlens einer 
Strategie um die Gewinne zu erhöhen Versuchspersonen sowohl Verluste als 
auch Gewinne für unerwartet hielten. Die P300 Effekte können dadurch erklärt 
werden, dass Versuchspersonen emotional auf den Namen der nahestehenden 
Person reagiert haben. 
 
 
SnPM comparison of person versus bank: time frame 4 (TF4) 
 
Activated anatomical region Voxel value MNI coordinates 
Inferior Parietal Lobule (BA 40) 7.96897E+0000 X = 45, Y= -35, Z = 35 
Inferior Parietal Lobule (BA 40) 7.80264E+0000 X = 45, Y = -35, Z = 40 
Inferior Parietal Lobule (BA 40) 7.50188E+0000 X = 40, Y = -40, Z = 40 
Inferior Parietal Lobule (BA 40) 7.35694E+0000 X = 40, Y = -35, Z = 40 
Inferior Parietal Lobule (BA 40) 7.24669E+0000 X = 40, Y = -35, Z = 45 
Inferior Parietal Lobule (BA 40) 7.09306E+0000 X = 40, Y = -40, Z = 45 
Precuneus (BA 7) 6.80140E+0000 X = -25, Y = -50, Z = 45 
Inferior Parietal Lobule (BA 40) 6.70579E+0000 X = 50, Y = -35, Z = 35 
Insula (BA 13) 6.66118E+0000 X = 50, Y = -30, Z = 20 
Inferior Parietal Lobule (BA 40) 6.65212E+0000 X = 50, Y = -30, Z = 25 
Insula (BA 13) 6.52410E+0000 X = 50, Y = -35, Z = 20 
Superior Temporal Gyrus (BA 41) 6.50847E+0000 X = 50, Y = -30, Z = 15 
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Superior Temporal Gyrus (BA 42) 6.48455E+0000 X = 55, Y = -35, Z = 15 
Postcentral Gyrus (BA 40) 6.48238E+0000 X = 55, Y = -30, Z = 20 
Superior Temporal Gyrus (BA 42) 6.45928E+0000 X = 55, Y = -30, Z = 15 
Insula (BA 13) 6.44626E+0000 X = 55, Y = -35, Z = 20 
Superior Temporal Gyrus (BA 41) 6.40890E+0000 X = 50, Y = -35, Z = 15 
Inferior Parietal Lobule (BA 40) 6.30990E+0000 X = 55, Y = -30, Z = 25 
Insula (BA 13) 6.25810E+0000 X = 45, Y = -35, Z = 20 
Superior Parietal Lobule (BA 7) 6.24526E+0000 X = -25, Y = -55, Z = 45 
Superior Temporal Gyrus (BA 41) 6.22772E+0000 X = 50, Y = -30, Z = 10 
Superior Temporal Gyrus (BA 41) 6.22666E+0000 X = 55, Y = -30, Z = 10 
Insula (BA 13) 6.19864E+0000 X = 55, Y = -40, Z = 20 
Superior Temporal Gyrus (BA 42) 6.12681E+0000 X = 60, Y = -35, Z = 20 
Postcentral Gyrus (BA 40) 6.09332E+0000 X = 55, Y = -25, Z = 15 
Superior Temporal Gyrus (BA 22) 6.08834E+0000 X = 65, Y = -40, Z = 15 
Superior Temporal Gyrus (BA 42) 6.08742E+0000 X = 60, Y = -30, Z = 15 
Inferior Parietal Lobule (BA 40) 6.08161E+0000 X = 40, Y = -45, Z = 45 
Inferior Parietal Lobule (BA 40) 6.07655E+0000 X = 55, Y = -35, Z = 25 
Precuneus (BA 7) 6.07113E+0000 X = -20, Y =-55, Z = 45 
Insula (BA 13) 6.06391E+0000 X = 50, Y = -40, Z = 20 
Inferior Parietal Lobule (BA 40) 6.06017E+0000 X = 40, Y = -35, Z = 35 
Inferior Temporal Gyrus (BA 20) 6.05101E+0000 X = 60, Y = -25, Z = -25 
Postcentral Gyrus (BA 40) 6.04495E+0000 X = 60, Y = -30, Z = 20 
Table 4: All the significantly activated voxels with their specific MNI coordinates found in time 
frame 4 of the comparison between person and bank. The voxel values are above the threshold 
value (6.040) for the significance level of .05. Because all values are positive, all significant voxels 
were stronger activated in the person-condition.  
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SnPM comparison of bank versus person: time frame 5 (TF5) 
 
Activated anatomical region Voxel value MNI coordinates 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 47) 6.76065E+0000 X = 45, Y= 40, Z = -15 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA 47) 6.59481E+0000 X = 45, Y = 40, Z = -10 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA 11) 6.58800E+0000 X = 40, Y = 35, Z = -10 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA 11) 6.58064E+0000 X = 40, Y = 35, Z = -15 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 47) 6.54551E+0000 X = 45, Y = 35, Z = -15 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 47) 6.38854E+0000 X = 45, Y = 35, Z = -10 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA 47) 6.37099E+0000 X = 45, Y = 40, Z = -5 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA 47) 6.33774E+0000 X = 40, Y = 40, Z = -10 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 47) 6.25935E+0000 X = 35, Y = 30, Z = -5 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA 47) 6.25607E+0000 X = 40, Y = 40, Z = -5 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA 11) 6.24034E+0000 X = 35, Y = 35, Z = -10 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA 11) 6.22416E+0000 X = 45, Y = 45, Z = -10 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 47) 6.20555E+0000 X = 35, Y = 30, Z = -10 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 47) 6.16820E+0000 X = 50, Y = 40, Z = -10 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA 11) 6.14156E+0000 X = 35, Y = 35, Z = -15 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 47) 6.13204E+0000 X = 50, Y = 45, Z = -10 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 10) 6.10492E+0000 X = 45, Y = 45, Z = 0 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 47) 6.09571E+0000 X = 40, Y = 30, Z = -10 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA 11) 6.08155E+0000 X = 45, Y = 45, Z = -15 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 47)) 6.05371E+0000 X = 40, Y = 30, Z = -5 
Table 5: Again, the significantly activated voxels with their specific MNI coordinates, now found in 
time frame 5 are shown. The voxel values are above the threshold value (6.040) for the 
significance level of .05. Because all values are positive, all significant voxels were stronger 
activated in the person-condition. 
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